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THE ATTAINDER BOGY IN MODERN LEGISLATION
UNITED STATES v. LOVETT AND THE ATTAINDER BOGY
IN MODERN LEGISLATION
WYLIE H. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the broad protection afforded by the due
process clauses of the Federal Constitution against arbitrary or
discriminatory legislation, it is sometimes easier to draw a like
protection from those clauses that anticipate special cases. One
such clause warns Congress that "No bill of attainder or ex post
facto law shall be passed,"' and another clause places a similar
restriction on state power. 2 Until the decision in United States
v. Lovett 3 three years ago, these guarantees had played a com-
paratively minor part in the United States Supreme Court's
steady, and of late, robust crusade for civil liberties. The Court,
by invalidating as legislative attaint a rider to an appropriation
act that cut off the salaries of three named federal officers, has
raised in that case new and already recurring implications from
the guaranties against bills of attainder. Both the decision and
its possibilities deserve analysis, in which the relevant English,
Colonial, and constitutional background is necessarily a critical
factor.
II. ENGLISH AND COLONIAL BILLS OF ATTAINDER
The framers of the Constitution were thoroughly familiar'
with legislative attaint, which was by no means rare either in
England or the American Colonies.5 Bills of attainder had come
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. U. S. CONsT. Art 1, § 9, cl. 3.
2. Id. Art. I, §10, cl. 1.
3. 328 U. S. 303 (1946). Noted, 8 ALA. LAW. 197 (1947), 46 COL. L. REv.
849 (1946), 45 MICH. L. REV. 98 (1946), 21 TULANE L. Rv. 278 (1946),
35 U. OF PA. L. REV. 80 (1946), and 33 VA.. L. REv. 88 (1947).
4. Bills of attainder were dealt with extensively by eminent writers of
the time and by earlier writers whose works were standard reference for
American lawyers and statesmen: 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 46 (3d ed.
1884); 4 id. at 259 et seq.; COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE 14, 36-9 (1809); THE
FEDERaLST, No. 84 (Madison), Nos. 78, 66, 65 (Hamilton), No. 44 (Madi-
son). It is significant that the bill of attainder clauses were adopted by
the Convention without discussion, indicating the framers' familiarity with
a definite and specific abuse.
5. The origin and development of bills of attainder in England and
America may be gleaned from such sources as ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL
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into vogue in England during the fifteenth century as acts of
Parliament which in effect tried, convicted, and eliminated a
man without benefit of jury, hearing in court, confrontation,
production of witnesses, and without regard for the rules of
evidence. A bill of attainder was distinguishable from the less
severe bill of pains and penalties in that the former exacted
capital punishment and invariably worked a corruption of blood.0
In the beginning Parliament served only as a rubber stamp
for bills of attainder directed against those who had incurred
the royal displeasure7 but during the reign of Charles I (1625-
1649) Parliament went into the attainder business in its own
right. The act which took the head of Thomas Wentworth, Earl
of Strafford and chief adviser of Charles I, may be cited as
typical of this gory English tradition. A part of the text of
this act is reproduced here, with spacing and marginal designa-
tions which indicate the historical essentials of a bill of at-
tainder:
Named Whereas .... [the members] .... of the House
Inividual of Commons .... have .... impeached Thomas
Earl of Strafford
of High Treason for endeavoring to subvert the
ancient and fundamental Laws and Government
of His Majesty's Realms... and to introduce an
arbitrary and tyrannical Government against the
laws of the said Kingdoms And for exercising a
Recital of tyrannous and exorbitant Power .... And like-
"Criminal" wise for having by his own Authority commanded
Activities the seating of soldiers upon His Majesty's Sub-jects in Ireland against their consent to compel
them to obey his unlawful summons & orders ....
and in so doing did levy war against the King
... ; And also for that he upon the unhappy dis-
solution of the last Parliament did slander the
House of Commons to His Majesty ....
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 229 (Schuyler's ed. 1934); CooLEY, PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 311 (3d ed. 1898); POMEROY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
410-11 Bennett's ed. 1888); Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL.
L. REv. 1-12 (1914); Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation during the
American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REV. 81, 147 (1948).
6. It will be seen inf'a that this distinction as a practical matter no
longer exists. Both bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties have
been held to be encompassed by the constitutional prohibitions.
7. Henry VIII was particularly choleric in this respect.
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For which he deserves to undergo the pains and
Declaration forfeitures of High Treason .... All which Of-
of Guilt fenses have been sufficiently proved against the
said Earl upon his Impeachment [which had been
withdrawn when acquittal became evident].
Legislative Be it therefore enacted .... That the said Earl
Judgment of Strafford stand and be adjudged attainted ofHigh Treason
and shall suffer such pains of Death and incur
Punishment the Forfeitures of his Goods and Chattels, Lands
Tenements & Hereditaments of any Estate of
Freehold or Inheritance in .... England and Ire-
land .... [spelling modernized]$
Parliament sometimes made the punishment conditional in a
sense when the victim was not conveniently within reach of the
ax. In 1665, for example, it passed "An Act for attainting ....
[three named persons] .... of High Treason if they render not
themselves by a day."9 The crime recited in that statute was
that the attainted were "nortoriously known . . . [to] have
traiterously and wickedly adhered and still do adhere to [the
King's] enemies beyond the Seas where they as yet remain..."
Significantly, this same act, and others like it, also attainted on
similarly stated grounds whole classes of persons without nam-
ing them and without relying on past conduct except insofar as
it might be immediately past when the attaint should attach in
futuro by operation of law:
And be it further enacted .... That all [the King's] Sub-jects who from and after the First day of February next
ensuing shall at any time during the continuance of the said
War serve the States of the United Provinces .... shall be
and are hereby attainted of High Treason and shall suffer
and forfeit to all intents and purposes as persons attainted
of High Treason ought to do.
Theoretically, the English Parliament even today has the
power to inflict summary punishment without a trial,'- but it
has not so acted since 1820.
8. 16 CAR. I, e. 38 (1640). The attainder was removed in 1662 by the
statute of 14 CAR. II, c. 29, but too late to be of personal comfort to the
Earl.
9. 17 CAR. II, c. 5 (1665).
10. Attainder even upon judicial conviction, with consequent corruption
of blood, forfeiture, or escheat, has been abolished in England. 33 & 34
VicT., c. 23 (1870). However, this would not seem to preclude legislative
Washington University Open Scholarship
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America inherited bills of attainder along with the English
language, and the Revolution gave impetus to many such bills in
the Colonial legislatures as a means of making Loyalism un-
'profitable. As in England, however, most of this legislation was
-spawned by pure emotionalism; it was hardly necessary or rea-
sonably calculated to help win the Independence. Exemplary of
that type was Massachusetts' act of banishment of September,
1778, which forbade the return to the Province of 308 named
persons, including sixty-five Harvard graduates.1
Not all of the Colonial acts of attainder were quite so repug-
nant to our present-day public conscience. Virginia in 1778
passed "An act to attaint Josiah Philips and others, unless they
render themselves to justice within a certain time," the culprits
having "levied war against this commonwealth within the same,
committing murders, burning houses, wasting farms, and doing
other acts of hostility. 112 The Virginia Legislature attempted to
justify the act by pointing therein to "the delays which would
.*attend the proceeding to outlaw the said offenders, according to
the usual forms and procedures of the courts of law ... "
III. EARLY BILLS or ATTAINDER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
One may conclude that it has been characteristic of bills of
attainder to germinate most prolifically in a matrix of violence
and impassioned legislative temper. The Civil War Period was
no exception, and the efforts of the United States and its com-
ponents to crush the Rebellion gave birth to those acts which
first collided headlong with the Federal Constitution. Both the
majority and concurring opinions of the Supreme Court in the
Lovett case purported to rely heavily on the five to four decisions
of the Court, per Mr. Justice Field, in Cummings v. Missou i "3
and Ex Parte Go'ldnd.-4 Only the latter involved an act of Con-
gress, but the two are of equal authority in determining what a
bill of attainder is within the meaning of either of the constitu-
tional prohibitions.
These decisions condemned legislative acts which were not so
bills of pains and penalties short of corruption of blood, etc. Cf. U. S.
CoNsT. Art. III, § 3, cl. 3.
11. 5 Acts & Resolves of Massachusetts Bay 912 (1778).
12. 9 LAws or VntGINL 463 (Hening 1821).
13. 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
14. 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
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patently bills of attainder as most of those with which the
Fathers had had a working acquaintance. In the Cummings
case the defendant challenged a provision of the Missouri con-
stitution which required priests and clergymen, as a prerequisite
to further preaching and teaching, to take and subscribe an oath
that they had not committed certain designated acts, some of
which were already penal offenses, and others of which at the
time were acts innocent in themselves. All the acts, which in-
cluded expressions of sympathy with the Confederacy as well as
overt hostility to the Union, were characterized as disloyalty to
the United States. It is important to note that all were specified
in some deail. The defendant, a Roman Catholic priest, was con-
victed in the Missouri state courts of the crime of teaching and
preaching without having first taken the prescribed oath, and
was sentenced to pay a fine of $500, with body commitment until
the fine should be paid.
In reversing the Missouri Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Field
distinguished the expurgatory oath of Missouri from those test
oaths in England and France which "were always limited to an
affirmation of present belief, or present disposition towards the
government, and were never exacted with reference to particular
instances of past misconduct. . . ."' [italics added]. While he
was sympathetic generally with the State's contention that each
state possessed the reserved power to prescribe conditions upon
which its citizens might exercise their various callings and pur-
suits within its jurisdiction, he considered it a clear non sequitur
to say that the state could "in effect inflict a punishment for a
past act which was not punishable at the time it was com-
mitted.""
Bills of attainder are not too well dissected by the majority
opinion in the Cummings case. The problem of what may amount
to the requisite punishment, for example, gets only the light of
diffusion from the following summary:
The theory upon which our political institutions rest is,
that all men have certain inalienable rights-that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that
in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all
positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the pro-
tection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any
15. 4 Wall. 277, 318 (U. S. 1866).
16. Id. at 319.
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deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past
conduct is punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined.' 7
[italics added]
In his strictly definitive forays, Mr. Justice Fields is only slightly
more helpful:
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts pun-
ishment without a judicial trial.
If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a
bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penal-
ties. 8 In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its
legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office of
judges; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judi-
cial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party,
without any of the forms or safeguards of trial; it deter-
mines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether con-
formable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes
the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions
of the enormity of the offense. 9
The cleavage of the Court in the Lovett case on the issue
whether the statute attacked there was a bill of attainder may
-have been partly the result of Fieldian efforts to make Missouri's
transgression consistent with historical standards:
"A British Act of Parliament," to cite the language of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky,20 "might declare, that if certain
individuals, or a class of individuals, failed to do a given act
by a named day, they should be deemed to be .... convicted
felons or traitors. Such an act comes precisely within the
definition of a bill of attainder, and the English courts
would enforce it without indictment or trial by jury."21
The existing clauses [in the Missouri constitution] pre-
sume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and adjudge
the deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the
presumption be first removed by their expurgatory oath-
in other words, they assume the guilt and adjudge the pun-
ishment conditionally. The clauses supposed22 differ only in
that they declare the guilt instead of assuming it. The dep-
17. Id. at 321.
18. This merger of the two types originated with a dictum in Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 138 (U. S. 1810), which was essentially a case on state
impairment of the obligation of contract. By way of analogy, Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall said: "A bill of attainder may affect the life of an indi-
vidual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both."
19. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U. S. 1866).
20. Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana 481, 510 (Ky. 1833).
21. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324 (U. S. 1866).
22. Hypotheticals by Mr. Justice Field.
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rivation is effected with equal certainty in the one case as
it would be in the other, but not with equal directness. The
purpose of the lawmaker in the case supposed would be
openly avowed; in the case existing it is only disguised.
The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly, The Constitution deals
with substance, not shadows.23 Its inhibition was leveled at
the thing not the name. It intended that the rights of the
citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct
by legislative enactment, under any form, however dis-
guised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the
enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain
and futile proceeding.24 [italics added]
It should be borne in mind in examining this language that Mr.
Justice Field had a relatively easy task in deferring to history
on the facts before him and was formulating with those facts as
a reference. It may not be assumed from anything in the opinion
that he intended to make the constitutional abolition of bills of
attainder a catchall for every kind of discriminatory legislation
aimed at named individuals or ascertainable classes. On the con-
trary, he exerted himself to preserve in its substance the tradi-
tional concept of bills of attainder. It should also be emphasized
that his major difficulty lay in exposing the Missouri oath of
loyalty as mere window-dressing which operated only to make
the punishment conditional.
After weighing all the language, the facts in the record, and
the Court's recognition that bills of attainder were the same
under the Constitution as before, one may draw at least the out-
side limits of the Cummings decision. The case certainly goes no
further than to announce that a legislative act which declares or
assumes the guilt of named individuals or an ascertainable class
of having committed designated acts25 and which absolutely or
conditionally inflicts punishment therefor, without a trial in
court, by depriving the persons affected of the right to follow a
23. This sentence and those following it gave the majority in the Lovett
case more than enough excuse for saying in effect that the Lovett decision
was not really changing the law at all.
24. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U. S. 1866).
25. Although Mr. Justice Field stresses the fact that some of the acts
comprising the mischief of the Missouri provision were not penal offenses
at the time, it is pretty certain that he did this only to highlight the
enormity of Missouri's outrage against the Federal Constitution. What-
ever the preexisting legal status of the individual's conduct, the absence
of a judicial trial is controlling on the point.
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lawful calling, is a bill of attainder within the meaning of the
Constitution.2
On the same day that the Court rescued Fr. Cummings from
Missouri tyranny, it also rebuked Congress in Ex Parte Garland,
supra, for a similar kind of malpractice. By an act of 1862 Con-
gress had prescribed an oath of office, applicable to all United
States officers except the president, whereby the affiant as a con-
dition precedent to holding office had to swear that he had never
engaged in armed hostility against the United States or given
aid or encouragement to persons so engaged. In 1865 this had
been extended in a supplementary act to embrace attorneys and
counsellors of the federal courts, i. e. the oath was required for
admission to or continuance at the bar. The petitioner had been
admitted by the Supreme Court in 1860 and had thereafter joined
the losers by representing Arkansas in the Confederate Con-
gress. In 1865, however, he received a full pardon of his mis-
deeds from the President of the United States and petitioned the
Supreme Court for permission to resume practice as a member
of its bar. Mr. Justice Field for the majority held that since
the oath could not truthfully be taken by individuals in the
petitioner's position, the statute prescribing it operated as a
legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from the practice of law
in the federal courts, and hence as a bill of attainder. Mr. Jus-
tice Miller voiced the strong dissents of four justices in both the
Garland and Cummings cases, his opinion being reported with
the former and directed at both.
So far as the attainder phase of the Garland case is concerned
(there were ancillary problems not here important), the ma-
jority opinion is even less illuminating than that in Cummings
v. Missouri. For example the following statement of Mr. Justice
Field embodies a sound but slippery principle:
The legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for
the office to which he [the office-holder or aspirant to office]
must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction,
prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of the ordi-
26. The Court held that the enactment in question was also unconsti-
tutional as an ex post facto law. The syllabus at 4 Wall. 277 defines such
a law as "one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not
punishable at the time it was committed or imposes additional punishment
to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or
different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required." Cf.
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dal. 386 (U. S. 1798), the first case holding that the
ex post facto inhibition applies exclusively to penal or criminal cases.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/7
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nary avocations of life. The question, in this case, is not as
to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but
whether that power has been exercised as a means for the
infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of the Con-
stitution. That this result cannot be effected indirectly by a
State under the form of creating qualifications we have held
in the case of Cummings v. Missouri, and the reasoning by
which that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar
action on the part of Congress.2 7
The Garland decision is elusive; but there is nothing in the
majority opinion to justify stretching it beyond a warning that
a statute which excludes a particular class from all or part of
an ordinary vocation or profession on account of designated
past acts without a judicial trial is not a mere prescription of
qualifications, but is a form of legislative punishment within the
bill of attainder prohibitions of the Federal Constitution.
Mr. Justice Miller in his hard-hitting dissentl distinguished
the legal profession from other callings and convincingly argued
that Congress has plenary power over federal practitioners as
such. Whether or not he was evading the question by assuming
that "plenary" power might include summary punishment, his
elementary analysis of bills of attainder is quite as accurate as
the majority's and more concrete. In his view the challenged
acts did not fill the bill:
.... I think it will be found that the following comprise
those essential elements of bills of attainder [in English
law], in addition to the one already mentioned [corruption
of blood],;' which distinguish them from other legislation,
and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who
organized our government:
1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by the
legislative department of the government, instead of the
judicial.
2. The sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted
were determined by no previous law or fixed rule.
3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any
such were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted
in his presence, or that of his counsel, and no recognized
rule of evidence governed the inquiry2 °
27. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379 (U. S. 1866).
28. Id. at 382 et seq.
29. Apparently Mr. Justice Miller did not choose to accept Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's dictum in Fletcher v. Peck (see note 18 supra) that
bills of attainder in the constitutional sense included bills of pains and
penalties, which did not usually work a corruption of blood.
30. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 388 (U. S. 1866).
Washington University Open Scholarship
22 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Disturbing doubts as to the stability of the Cummings and
Garland decisions, generated by Mr. Justice Miller's dissent and
by the critical comment of such eminent scribes as Professor
John Norton Pomeroy,3 1 should have been dispelled six years
later by Pierce v. Carskadon.32 In that case the Court in a sum-
mary opinion by Mr. Justice Field, with only Mr. Justice Bradley
dissenting, held that a statute of West Virginia was a bill of
attainder on the authority of the Cummings and Garland cases.
The West Virginia statute had required a test oath of loyalty
to be taken by litigants in the state courts as a condition of
petitioning for rehearings.
IV. LATER CASES ON ATTAINDER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The hiatus in the Supreme Court's ferreting of attainder from
1872 to 194633 may be attributed for the most part to the gradual
dissipation of intersectional bitterness after the Civil War. Apart
from the chastisement of the Cummings and Garland cases, it is
also probable that the restraining effect of Amendments V and
XIV, and the expanded protection they came to afford, minimized
the likelihood of legislative attaint. It is arguable too that legis-
lators generally, as well as the public, developed a more mature
sense of ordinary fairness. Still the lower federal courts and the
31. POMEROY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 510 (Bennett's ed. 1888). The
author agreed with Mr. Justice Miller's dissent and argued that historically
the legislation in neither case could have been a bill of attainder, conceding
that it might have been ez post facto in both cases.
32. 16 Wall. 234 (U. S. 1872).
33. It is not meant to imply that the Court did not consider the question
from 1872 to 1946. In Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 115 (1889), it
upheld a state statute which barred from the practice of medicine in West
Virginia any person who had not graduated from a reputable medical
college, or who had not already practiced at least ten years, or who had
not been found qualified by state examination. Mr. Justice Field had
little trouble in distinguishing the statute from the enactments in Cum-
mings and Garland: ... . The Constitution of Missouri and the Act of
Congress in question in those cases were designed to deprive parties of
their right to continue in their profession for past acts, or past expressions
of desires and sympathies, many of which had no bearing upon their fitness
to continue in their professions. The law of West Virginia was intended
to secure such skill and learning in the profession of medicine that the
community might trust with confidence those receiving a license under
authority of the state." 129 U. S. at 128.
Cf. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898), where the Court held
that New York could enact a law making it a misdemeanor for anyone
to practice medicine who had been convicted of a felony. The defendant
had been convicted of performing an illegal abortion twenty-three years
before the statute was passed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/7
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state courts were forced on occasion to resolve the issue in favor
of the Constitution.
There would be little profit in a detailed review of all the cases.
A brief look at three of them will suffice to illustrate the ver-
satility of bills of attainder and the ante-Lovett coverage of the
guaranties which prohibit them.
In 1888 the Chinese Exclusion Act of that year was applied
by the immigration authorities to deny re-entry to an American
citizen of Chinese descent. A federal court in Be Yung Sing
Hee3' held that, as so applied, the Act was a bill of attainder in
that it inflicted the punishment of exile expressly on account
of race or color.
The Kentucky Expatriation Act of 1862 deprived of their
state citizenship all persons in the state joining or aiding the
rebels, and further exacted a test oath of loyalty as a condition
precedent to voting. This was held to inflict the punishment of
a bill of attainder in Burkett v. McCarty,35 where the state court
artfully said, "A legislative act cannot make voluntary rebellion
involuntary expatriation." 3
The Florida constitution was held unconstitutional in 1870
insofar as it set aside all judgments and decrees rendered after
1861 upon any evidence of debts arising out of the sale or pur-
chase of slaves, and established a conclusive defense of failure
of consideration in all such future litigation. The Florida Su-
preme Court in McNealy v. Gregory" found that the purpose of
the constitutional convention had been to punish either for the
moral wrong of trafficking in slaves or for acts of hostility to
the United States, and that in either aspect the convention had
fashioned a bill of attainder.
There are several other cases reaching the same result on
widely varied facts3" All of the decisions seem to turn on the
34. 36 Fed. 437 (C. C. D. Ore. 1888).
35. 10 Bush 758 (Ky. 1866).
36. Id. at 762.
37. 13 Fla. 417 (1870).
38. State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570 (1869) (statute ousting a college board
of curators for having failed to take an oath of loyalty, and filling the
vacancies then and there declared); Green v. Shumway, 36 How. Pr. 5
(N. Y. 1868) (statute requiring oath of loyalty like that in the Cummings
case to be taken by electors of delegates to state constitutional amendment
convention); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371 (1873) (statute requiring
"suitor's test oath" to be filed with all defendants' petitions for rehear-
ings). A few other decisions invalidated statutes substantially the same
as those preceding: In re Baxter, 2 Fed. Cas. 1043, No. 1, 118 (C. C.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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question whether punishment had been inflicted, the other his-
torical elements of legislative attaint being present beyond seri-
ous dispute.
Similarly, a cry of punishment and consequent attainder has
been raised in a remarkably large number of cases where the
courts correctly found that there was no attainder at all. Enact-
ments so attacked before 1946 but held non-penal in character
range all the way from an Oklahoma statute authorizing sterili-
zation of habitual criminals upon court orders,39 to a California
state senate resolution expelling a member for taking a bribe.40
E. D. Tenn. 1866); State v. Highland, 41 Mo. 388 (1867); Murphy and
Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339 (1867); Lynch v. Hoffman, 7 W. Va.
553, 578 (1874) ; Ross v. Jenkins, 7 W. Va. 284 (1874).
But as to the Shumway case supra, compare Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594,
37 Pac. 16 (1894), where the Kansas constitution denied the right to vote
or hold public office to all persons who had aided the Confederacy, until
such disability should be removed by two-thirds of all members of the
legislature. Held: Not a bill of attainder on the ground that there was
nothing in the nature of a punishment for crime. The court made no
effort to distinguish Geen v. Shumway, but said that the latter was not
consistent with "the weight of authority."
Actually, the Kansas court seems to have been correct in its count of
noses, many of the state legislatures and courts having found it easy to
squirm from under Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parts Garland on the
basis that denying the franchise is a state prerogative and not punish-
ment, even though barring a person from a lawful vocation might be.
See, for example. Shepherd v. Grimmett, 2 Idaho 1123, 31 Pac. 793 (1892),
where a test oath for voters directed primarily against plural marriages
was sustained. The court held that the right of suffrage is a privilege
conferred or withheld by the legislature and is in no way like those
rights to follow chosen vocations which were infringed in the Cummings
and Garland cases. Of course, Amendment XV of the Federal Constitution
was not in issue in any of these cases.
39. Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. 2d 123(1941). The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the act was a "eugenic"
rather than punitive measure, and as such was analogous to compulsory
vaccination. In some respects the analogy is obviously remote. Fortunately
for defendant Skinner, the Supreme Court of the United States found the
act in this case unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the
laws. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).
40. French v. Senate of State of California, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031(1905). For other cases giving alleged bills of attainder clean bills of
health, see Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 595 (U. S. 1869) (Missouri statutory
exemption of acts done by military authority from suits based on such
acts); Dodez v. United States, 154 F. 2d 637 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd on
other grounds sub enom. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946)(the Selective Service At of 1940 and regulations thereunder); Story v.
Rives, 97 F. 2d 182 (D. C. Cir. 1938) (act of Congress requiring convicted
prisoners to serve remainders of their sentences after being returned to
confinement for violating conditions of release, without deducting the period
of release) ; People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 Pac. 601 (1924)(statute prohibiting possession of a pistol by one previously convicted of
a felony); Davis v. City of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S. E. 6 (1918)(city ordinance permitting local health officer to prohibit keeping of cows
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Thus even before United States v. Lovett lawyers were prone
to make long-shot bets on legislative attaint when it should have
been obvious that no such horse was running. There are indica-
tions that the Lovett decision may stimulate the betting some-
what.41
V. THE LOVETT SPECIES OF ATTAINDER
A. The Case
It appears from what has been said so far that the Supreme
Court had not upset an act of Congress as a bill of attainder
from 1866 until the Lovett decision was rendered in June, 1946.
Following are the facts which prompted the Court to brush
eighty years' dust off the constitutional guaranty against such
bills:
The three respondents prior to 1943 had held positions as
officers42 of the federal government for several years. In 1943
in any congested section of city if such keeping in his opinion would
endanger the public health); People v. Lawrence, 390 Il. 499, 61 N. E.
2d 361 (1945), cert. denied 326 U. S. 731 (1945) (habitual criminal act
making the punishment for a new offense heavier by reason of habitual
criminality of which defendant has been judicially convicted); Crampton
v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N. E. 360 (1923) (statutes disqualifying for
public office anyone sentenced to jail longer than six months for any
offense, and declaring conviction of infamous crime a ground for election
contest); Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P. 2d 272 (1943) (statute
permitting garnishment only up to 10% of debtor's earnings when they
are necessary for family support, but providing further that creditor
should not be entitled to any benefits of the act if he should have assigned
his claim to a collection agency before seeking to garnish); Moore v.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 55, 168 S. W. 2d 342 (1943) .(statute prescribing
forfeiture as a nuisance of property used for purpose of selling or possess-
ing liquor in dry territory); Mosher v. Bay Circuit Judge, 108 Mich. 503,
66 N. W. 384 (1896) (statute authorizing attachment on a claim not due);
Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1098, 193 S. W. 2d 588 (1946)
(statute requiring treble costs of any plaintiff in a civil suit who should
file three or more successive defective pleadings); State v. Graves, 352
Mo. 1102, 182 S. W. 2d 46 (1944) (statute providing that accused in
criminal case, when submitting himself as witness, may be impeached for
veracity by proof of prior conviction of crime); In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296,
108 P. 2d 858 (1940) (statute permitting only active members of state
bar to practice law in the state); Friedman v. American Surety Co. of
New York, 137 Tex. 149, 151 S. W. 2d 570 (1941) (state unemployment
compensation act exacting a social security tax); State v. Caubal, 248
Wis. 247, 21 N. W. 2d 381 (1946) (statute authorizing general injunction
to restrain permanently a liquor or beer licensee from knowingly per-
mitting any gambling device to be used on any premises controlled by him).
See also the cases cited note 33 and last two paragraphs of note 38 supra.
In several other cases the attainder issue has been considered incident-
ally in connection with the ex post facto problem.
41. See §VI infra.
42. Mr. Lovett was Executive Assistant to the Governor of the Virgin
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they were reported, along with others, by Congressman Martin
Dies to the House of Representatives for "subversive activities."
After closed hearings before a subcommittee, the House attached
the following rider, hereinafter referred to as Section 304, to
the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943:
No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which
is made available under or pursuant to this Act, or (2)
which is now, or which is hereafter made, available under
or pursuant to any other Act, to any department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States, shall be used, after
November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other
compensation for the personal services, of Goodwin B. Wat-
son, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss Lovett, un-
less prior to such date such person has been appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate:
Provided, That this section shall not operate to deprive any
such person of payment for leaves of absence or salary, or
of any refund or reimbursement, which have accrued prior
to November 15, 1943: Provided. further, That this section
shall not operate to deprive any such person of payment for
services performed as a member of a jury or as a member
of the armed forces of the United States nor any benefit,
pension, or emolument resulting therefrom. 3
This rider was passed by the Senate and approved by the
President only after the House was adamant (five seperate Con-
ference Reports were submitted to the Senate), and only to save
the vitally needed appropriation made by the act for prosecution
of the war. Respondents performed services for the government
in their respective jobs after November 15, 1943, and eventually
sued in the United States Court of Claims to recover compensa-
tion for such services after their demands for payment had been
refused. Respondents attacked Section 304 as an unconstitu-
tional encroachment by Congress on the executive power of
removal, as a violation, substantively and procedurally, of the
due process clause of Amendment V, and as a bill of attainder.
The Court of Claims entered judgment for the relief sought,44
but only two of the judges were able to agree on the theory of re-
covery. Those two in "the opinion of the Court" found it unneces-
sary to decide any of the constitutional issues raised by the re-
spondents, and held that Section 304 had merely cut off disbursal
Islands, and Messrs. Watson and Dodd were .ministerial officers of the
FCC.
43. 57 STAT. 431, 450 (1943).
44. 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
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of salaries without destroying the government's obligation to
pay for services rendered by respondents after November 15,
1943. The other three judges in separate opinions found Section
304 unconstitutional, but on three different bases, viz., as a bill
of attainder, a deprivation of due process, and simply an excess
of "the authority delegated to the Congress by the Constitution."
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the United States
for certiorari. The appeal was unusual in that the petitioner,
through the Solicitor General, asserted the unconstitutionality of
Section 304 in harmony with respondents' attack, Congress being
represented as amicus curiae to uphold the statute's validity. The
Court unanimously45 affirmed the judgments in favor of respon-
dents, with Mr. Justice Black writing the majority opinion that
Section 304 was a bill of attainder without deciding the other
constitutional questions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr.
Justice Reed, concurred in the result, but agreed with the con-
certed minority of the Court of Claims that Section 304 had
operated only to preclude normal disbursal of salaries and was
not a bar to abnormal disbursal by suit.
B. The MaJoarity Opinion
Nobody participating in the Lovett case had any quarrel with
Mr. Justice Field's definition of a bill of attainder as "a legisla-
tive act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.""4
The question what is punishment and how it must be inflicted in
order to ensnare a legislative act was the essence of the con-
troversy within the Court. Mr. Justice Black for the majority
read the Cummings and Garland decisions as standing for the
proposition that "legislative acts, no matter what their form,
that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the Constitution.' '47 Taken out of context, this is a fair state-
ment of the old cases, but what Mr. Justice Black did with it is
another thing.
Whatever the definition, the fact is that no case under the
Constitution until United States v. Lovett had found a bill of at-
tainder which differed in substance from those known to the
45. Mr. Justice Jackson was absent.
46. See text at note 19 supra.
47. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315 (1946).
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Constitutional Convention. In every case the legislative pro-
vision on its face declared or assumed guilt of a designated act
or condition and inflicted punishment therefor.
From a semantic point of view, it is difficult to isolate a pun-
ishment without at the same time finding that the recipient is
something, thinks something, or does something to evoke the
infliction. Furthermore, the same deprivation may be punish-
ment in one case and not in another. 8 The penal or non-penal
nature of the deprivation depends entirely on its purpose, and
the controlling indices of its purpose are whether it is general or
special and whether it reaches something which'the depriving
authority considers criminal or quasi-criminal. There can be no
punishment unless an individual or identifiable group is called
to task and abnormally restrained for a particular infraction,
actual or supposed. If the individual has a fair day in court, he
may incur a collectible debt to society. If a legislative body
ordains that he has incurred such a debt, he is saddled with a
bill of attainder. In either event, the presence or absence of a
transaction and a resulting debt determine the fact of collection,
the punishment.
A cursory re-examination of Section 304 of the Urger# Defi-
ciency Appropriation Act of 1943,'49 adjudged a bill of attainder,
is enough to show that it does not purport to punish the re-
spondents in satisfaction of a debt (expressed or assumed in the
form of guilt) springing from one or several of their past trans-
actions (expressed in the form of what Congress deemed to be
unallowable conduct).
It may be assumed that the majority opinions in Cummings v.
Missouri and Ex Parte Garland are still good law so far as they
go. It may also be assumed that Section 304 necessarily imposed
a deprivation which against a proper background would amount
to punishment. In rejecting the idea that Section 304 was a bill
of attainder, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made both assumptions.
On the whole he offers a sound historical analysis:
.... The distinguishing characteristic of a bill of attainder
is the substitution of legislative determination of guilt and
legislative imposition of punishment for judicial finding and
sentence .... It was this very special, narrowly restricted,
48. For example, many adjudicated violations of due process might well
have amounted to legislative punishment had they been directed against
individuals for punitive purposes.
49. See text at note 43 supra.
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intervention by the legislature, in matters for which a decent
regard for men's interest indicated a judicial trial, that the
Constitution prohibited. It must be recalled that the Con-
stitution was framed in an era when dispensing justice was
a well-established function of the legislature. . . . Bills of
attainder were part of what now are staple judicial func-
tions which legislatures then exercised. . . . Sec. 304 lacks
the characteristics of the enactments in the Statutes of the
Realm and Colonial Laws that bear the hallmarks of bills of
attainder.-,
Not only does Sec. 304 lack the essential declaration of
guilt. It likewise lacks the imposition of punishment in the
sense appropriate for bills of attainder .
Punishment presupposes an offense, not necessarily an
act previously declared criminal, but an act for which ret-
ribution is exacted. The fact that harm is inflicted by a
governmental authority does not make it punishment.51
This analysis accords with our prior course of decision.
In Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parte Garland, the Court
dealt with legislation of very different scope and significance
from that now before us. While the provisions involved in
those cases did not condemn or punish specific persons by
name they prescribed all guilty of designated offenses.52
Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion makes ample use of the
legislative history of Section 304 in arriving at his conclusion
that it was a bill of attainder; but it is not entirely clear whether
he used it to demonstrate that respondents were being punished,
or merely to satisfy himself that the actual purpose of Section
304 was to effect removals of office rather than simply to stop
payment of salaries. That the latter was his objective is indi-
cated strongly both by the subdivisional arrangement of the
opinion and by his language. Thus in Section I of the opinion
proper, which directly follows his statement of the case and re-
view of the enactment's legislative history, Mr. Justice Black
says, apparently for the sole purpose of showing the constitu-
tional issue to be justiciable, that the phrasing of Section 304 in
the light of its history operated to oust respondents from office
and not just to halt normal disbursal of salaries:
In view of the facts just set out we cannot agree with the
two judges of the Court of Claims who held that Sec. 304
required a "mere stoppage of disbursing routine, nothing
more ....
50. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 318, 321-2 (1946).
51. Id. at 323-4.
52. Id. at 327.
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We hold that the purpose of Sec. 304 was not merely to
cut off respondents' compensation through regular channels
but permanently to bar them from government service, and
that the issue of whether it is constitutional is justiciable.
The section's language as well as the circumstances of its
passage which we have just described show that no mere
question of compensation procedure or of appropriations
was involved, but that it was designed to force the employing
agencies to discharge respondents and to bar their being
hired by any other governmental agency .... 53
Having found with the aid of legislative history that the
validity of Section 304 was justiciable, Mr. Justice Black then
proceeds in Section II of his opinion to find that the statute is a
bill of attainder. He holds that the ouster of respondents was
punishment, but nowhere does he explicitly rely on legislative
history to support that view. After observing that Section 304
was of the same noxious stripe as the enactments in the Cum-
mings and Garland cases, he does afford an inference of such
a reliance:
Section 304 was designed to apply to particular individ-
uals. Just as the statute in the two cases mentioned, it
"operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion"
from a chosen vocation. . . . This permanent proscription
from any opportunity to serve the government is punish-
ment, and of a most severe type....
.... The fact that the punishment is inflicted through the
instrumentality of an act specifically cutting off the pay of
certain named individuals found guilty of disloyalty, makes
it no less galling or effective than if it had been done by an
Act which designated the conduct as criminal. No one would
think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating
that after investigation it had found [respondents] "guilty"
of engaging in "subversive activities," defined that term for
the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion
from any government employment. Section 304, while it
does not use that language, accomplishes that result. The
effect was to inflict punishment without the safeguards of ajudicial trial and "determined by no previous law or fixed
rule.' ' 5 [italics added]
Although Mr. Justice Black ignores the possibility that many
violations of due process and other infringements, and indeed
many valid statutes, may be considerably more "galling and
effective" than was Section 304 without raising the slightest
53. 328 U. S. 303, 313-4 (1946).
54. Id. at 316-7.
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suggestion of legislative attaint, he does definitely imply by his
reference to "individuals found guilty of disloyalty" and to a
hypothetical statute declaring "'guilt' of engaging in 'subversive
activities,'" that punishment can be, and was, found in legisla-
tive history. On the other hand, the first paragraph of the quota-
tion above and his opinion as a whole smacks of the extreme view
that, once a removal from office is established, partly by recourse
to legislative history, then so far as all the other critical indicia
are concerned Section 304 is a bill of attainder on its face. If he
does so hold, he tacitly agrees with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that
a bill of attainder must independently reveal legislative punish-
ment; but unlike Mr. Justice Frankfurter he does not require
guilt of an actual or supposed offense as an anterior ingredient
of punishment. 5
It is hardly believable that the majority would have held
Section 304 a bill of attainder if its legislative history had ex-
posed no more than purpose to remove respondents for a "good"
cause, and had lent no support to the theory that the House of
Representatives was out to "get" respondents without worrying
too much about the justification. But whatever Mr. Justice Black
intended to mean by his opinion, he veered sharply from a course
of decision established within rather narrow limits by Cummings
l'. Missouri, Ex Parte Garland, and subsequent cases. The only
difference in the two possible meanings of his opinion is one of
degree: Although he pays lip service to the Cummings and Gar-
land decisions and their adherence to a historical concept, in fact
he short-circuits both the cases and the concept by saying either
-that Section 304 per se satisfies the requirements for legislative
attaint, or that the necessary punishment may be adduced with
the help of legislative history. Only the amperage is greater in
one wire than in the other.
A remaining problem is whether the majority in United States
v. Lovett was justified in reactivating the constitutional pro-
hibition of bills of attainder in a form of unheard-of vigor and
scope. If Section 304 is adjudged a bill of attainder on its face,
the answer ought to be negative and short, for the decision in
that event could fairly mean that a wide variety of deprivative
55. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to have interpreted the majority
opinion as saying that the requisite declaration or assumption of guilt
may be drawn from the circumstances of enactment as a basis for finding
of punishment. 328 U. S. 303, 318, 330 (1946).
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legislation in the reasonable exercise of police power or in a
field where the legislature has plenary power would be subject
to attack as legislative attaint.5 6
More complex is the question whether Mr. Justice Black was
warranted in curing by resort to legislative history a fatal defect
in the "punishment" inflicted by Section 304-if that is what he
did. In the first place, there is little doubt that one grant or
limitation of the Constitution may inherently and in the circum-
stances of its inclusion be far more susceptible than another of
reasonable judicial latitude in its application. Some provisions
were intentionally made general and elastic in respect of the
things they should embrace; others for good reason were made
specific and rigid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion is persuasive that the bill of attainder clauses properly
belong to the latter category:
Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims come
before this court. Most constitutional issues derive from
the broad standards of fairness written into the Constitut-
tion (e. g. "due process," "equal protection of the laws,"
"just compensation"), and the division of power as between
States and nation. Such questions, by their very nature,
allow a relatively wide play for individual legal judgment.
The other class gives no such scope. For this second class
of constitutional issues derives from very specific provisions
of the Constitution. These had their source in definite
grievances and led the Fathers to proscribe against recur-
rence of their experience. These specific grievances and the
safeguards against their recurrence were not defined by the
Constitution. They were defined by history. Their meaning
was so settled by history that definition was superfluous.
Judicial enforcement of the Constitution must respect these
historic limits.57
If there is a germ of truth in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's postu-
late, there can be no justification in experience for digging half
of a bill of attainder out of the statute's legislative history, even
conceding that the legal fact of removal from office may be sub-
stantiated by reference to the chronicle of enactment.
The suggestion that in construing Section 304 it was reason-
able for the majority to examine the legislative record in order
to help ascertain the fact of removal raises another possible
objection to using that record for a determination of punish-
56. See the Hatch Act discussion, Section VI infra.
57. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 318, 321 (1946).
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ment. The distinction has often been made judicially that the
Court should not inquire into the motive of Congress but only
into its purpose or intent. Thus if legislative history reveals in
a doubtful case that Congress intended to act upon a subject
matter over which it has power to act and the means used could
be reasonably calculated to effectuate its intent, its motive in
so acting acting is not judicially cognizable.e& An analogous
principle that a state legislature's motive is immaterial where
the legislature employs reasonable means within the sphere of
its police power has been so generally invoked as to need no
citation. It is true that if Congress or a state legislature exceeds
its constitutional power because its purpose is to reach some-
thing beyond the range of that power, the statute may be in-
validated ;59 but in that case the legislative motive, avowedly at
least, is still ignored and only the purpose and actual effect of
the statute are controlling.
In applying the distinction toward a proper judicial construc-
tion of Section 304, one might conclude that the purpose of Con-
gress to remove or not to remove respodents was a question the
Court might answer with the aid of legislative history, but that
Congress' motive of inflicting punishment or action for some
other reason was not the Court's concern at all. However, the
motive-intent dichotomy is a tenuous one at best, and particularly
in the bill of attainder field its use is likely to trap the user in a
circuitous maze. The peculiar difficulty of the L&vett situation is
that punishment is a necessary element of legislative attaint.
Whereas the issue of punishment in most cases is not essential
to deciding the nature of a statute, in the bill of attainder case
it may tenably be considered a part of the legislature's purpose.
Motive here shades indistinguishably into intent, and it is easy
to say that Congress intended both to remove respondents and to
punish them by removal. If it be countered that such a position
leaves no motive at all and that Congress must have harbored
some motive, the defense is that the motive of Congress was
simply to cleanse the government of subversives. If one would
58. See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251, 277 et seq. (1918); see also United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
312 U. S. 100, 115 (1941); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506,
513-4 (1937) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 93 (1919).
59. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936); A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 542-51 (1935); Weaver v.
Palmer Brothers Co., 270 U. S. 402 (1926).
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deny the propriety of falling back on legislative history to estab-
lish the penal nature of Section 304, and this writer does deny
it, it seems far safer to rely upon the obstacle raised against that
procedure by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, viz., that the historical
character of bills of attainder as narrowly and specifically under-
stood by the Framers of the Constitution precludes a legitimate
alteration by the Court.
But assuming, arguendo, that the majority should have looked
behind the statute to discover whether punishment was lurking
about, there is some reason to believe that in this case they looked
with myopic effect. It seems tough to argue that the intent of
Congress in attaching Section 304 is determinable from the
legislative history beyond mere conjecture, despite the fact that
Mr. Justice Black's opinion extracts an intent to punish re-
spondents (or can be read that way) from the hotchpot of de-
bate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
criticizes this extraction by observing that the Senate also be-
longs, and that by accepting Section 304 the Senate in nowise
intended to punish respondents or to pass judgment on their
conduct or political views. Perhaps it would be more accurate
to say that the Senate did not want to intend to punish respon-
dents, as attested by its first vote of 69 to'O against the rider.
But if the statute worked a punishment in fact, it seems clear
that the Senate with its eyes open intended that result. What
is done reluctantly is nonetheless done.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter might better have pointed to the lower
chamber's proceedings as failing to demonstrate that Section
304 was ever intended as a retributive measure and hence should
have been given the bnefit of a remedial characterization. The
House debates on the matter provide an amorphous framework
for a judicial finding of the House's intent, because the pro-
ponents of the rider advanced various discordant theories of its
purpose and operation. Only some of those theories included
the idea of punishment. A Note at 45 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100-1
(1946) belabors the point well:
.... The majority seek support for the theory that punish-
ment was intended from the legislative history of the meas-
ure in the House. In the resort to such words as "guilt,"
"indictment," "innocent," and "accused '6o during the de-
bates .... they find clear indications of a retributive purpose
60. 89 CONG. REc. 651, 711, 741 (1943); 328 U. S. 303, 325 (1946).
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on the part of the legislators.... A survey of all the debates,
however, reveals as many positive averments that no ques-
tion of crime or punishment was involved. The supporters
of the resolution appointing the Kerr Committee and of Sec.
304 based on its findings, interpreted the proceeding as one
for determining the fitness of those charged to serve the
government in a time of national emergency and to eliminate
those of doubtful loyalty. It was insistently argued that "it
does not mean that they are even charged with any crime,"
that the "committee has convicted no one," that the respon-
dents were not being "persecuted for their ideas," but that
the question was simply whether "the Congress of the
United States feels these men are qualified to serve .... "-
Finally, it may not be unreasonable to guess that the major-
ity's judgment was influenced to some degree by the "smear"
campaign and grossly unfair procedure to which respondents
had been subjected. Mr. Justice Black, though he does not say
so, was clearly indignant over the irresponsible tirades of Con-
gressman Dies and his cohorts on the floor of the House, as
well as the star chamber subcommittee hearings from which
counsel for respondents or lawyers representing their employer
agencies were barred.63
Suppose on the other hand that the procedural treatment of
respondents had been fair in every way and that the subcom-
mittee had uncovered fresh and strong evidence of respondent's
actual leadership in the Communist Party. Suppose further that
respondents had voluntarily admitted well-laid plans to assassi-
nate the president and blow up the Capitol after another six
months of infiltration. Suppose that otherwise the facts had
been exactly the same as they actually were when the Court took
the case. It is no reflection on the majority to suggest that they
might then have found no punishment in Section 304, but merely
a removal of respondents in the interest of safety.
Yet punishment is punishment, whether it is justified or not,
and the bill of attainder clauses protect the wicked as well as
the innocent.
C. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Position
It has been seen that Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed in result
with the Lovett decision, but that he approved "the opinion" of
61. 89 CONG. REc. 653, 4601, 4554, 4596 (1943).
62. 328 U. S. 303, 308-9 (1946).
63. Id. at 310-11.
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the Court of Claims that the statute was valid because it did no
more than to cut off ordinary disbursal of respondents' salaries.
Note his painstaking admonition to proceed with caution:
It is not for us to find unconstitutionality in what Con-
gress enacted although it may imply notions that are abhor-
rent to us as individuals or policies we deem harmful to the
country's well-being, . . . And so "it must be remembered
that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
courts'"' 4 .... [quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri, K.
& T. R. Co. v. Mayi, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904)]
.... Sec. 304 .... undoubtedly raises serious constitu-
tional questions. But the most fundamental principle of
constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional
questions but to avoid them, if at all possible. And so the
"Court developed, for its own governance in the cases con-
fessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which
it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitu-
tional questions pressed upon it for decision." Brandeis, J.,
concurring, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U. S. 288, 341, at 346... a
... The approach appropriate to such a case as the one
before us was thus summarized by Mr. Justice Holmes in a
similar situation: ...... the rule is settled that as between
two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act. Even to avoid
a serious doubt the rule is the same. . . ." "'When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
62." Brandeis, J., concurring, in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, supra, at 348.68
The concurring justice then rationalizes as follows the con-
struction he deems mandatory:
* ,* *The obvious, or at the least, the one certain con-
struction of Sec. 304 is that it forbids the disbursing agents
of the Treasury to pay out of specifically appropriated
moneys sums to compensate respondents for their services
64. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 318, 319 (1946).
65. Id. at 320.
66. Id. at 329-30. Apparently, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had to steady
himself here and there with a nip of Old Holmes or Old Brandeis.
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there is .... much in the debates not only in the Senate
but also in the House which supports the mere fiscal scope
to be given to the statute. That such a construction is tena-
ble settles our duty to adopt it and to avoid determinations
of constitutional questions of great seriousness.6 7
No one will deny that the rule of construction invoked by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter is a salutary one, but query, whether his
construction saving the statute is "fairly possible." At the out-
set it imputes to Congress the intent that respondents might
pursue their government jobs without pay, "subverting" all the
while, until their normal tenure should expire or until they
should be properly removed by executive authority. This theory
would be bizarre enough on its face, but the language of Section
304 also militates against it. It is asking too much to believe
that Congress did not intend to oust respondents from office
when it commanded that "No part of any appropriation, allo-
cation, or fund (1) which is made available under . . .. this
Act, or (2) .... under .... any other Act, to any department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States, shall be used
.... to pay any part of the salary [of respondents]."6 The
legislative intent is brought into even sharper relief by the sub-
sequent provision that salaries should not be cut off if prior to
the date of stoppage "such person has been appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ...."
It is an obscure process whereby a person may be "appointed"
to office, effective on a specified date, if on that date he is not
to be considered either out of or removed from office.
It is of course true that some of the legislative history of Sec-
tion 304 supports the notion of its "mere fiscal scope." But that
cannot explain away the clear import of the statutory language
itself, and the task is not eased by much of what transpired in
the House before enactment. For instance the investigating sub-
committee's reports stated that the investigations were regarded
as having the ultimate purpose of purging the public service of
anyone found guilty of "subversive actiVity."' 9 Again, the sub-
committee's findings specifically as to respondents conluded that
"he is, therefore, unfit for the present to continue in Government
67. Id. at 330.
68. For §304 in full, see text at note 43 supra.
69. H. R. REP. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1948).
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employment," or that "this official is unfit to hold a position of
trust with this Government....,"70
By and large, the language of Section 304 and the whole
pattern of its history.must be tortured in order to escape the
verdict that Congress intended to remove and did remove the
respondents. That the removal was poorly disguised as an inno-
cent exercise of the spending power does not justify a salvaging
of the statute, no matter how strong the policy of avoiding a
condemnation.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOVETT CASE AND ITS
APPARENT ISOLATION
Among the other serious constitutional issues raised by the
Lovett case,u Congress' alleged infringement of the executive
removal power was probably ripest for decision.72 The hazards
70. Id. at 6, 12.
71. See second paragraph, Section V (A) supr.
72. The Court has never decided whether Congress may constitutionally
assume any part of the removal power, except, of course, by impeachment.
The removal power questions decided so far may be summarized as follows:(1) The president does not possess the power of summary removal ex-
clusively. It may be exercised by heads of departments or by federal
courts when the appointing power is vested in them by Congress pursuant
to U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2, cL 2. Ez parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (U. S.
1839) (sustained removal by federal judge of a clerk appointed by the
removing court under congressional authority); see United States v.
Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886) (secretary of the navy might not dis-
charge a naval cadet engineer at will, but must conform to removal re-
strictions imposed by Congress when it gave the secretary power to appoint
such officers).(2) The president may remove at will any "purely executive" officer
appointed by him with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by him
alone where Congress expressly waives the Senate's advice and consent,
notwithstanding Congress may have fixed the tenure and in addition pro-
vided that the officer might be removed only for specified causes. Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926) (sustained president's summary re-
moval of postmaster even though the act authorizing a ppointments re-
quired that removals be made "by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate," 19 STAT. 80, 81 [1876]); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S.
311 (1903) ("general power" of the president to remove is not restricted
as to government appraisers of merchandise by congressional authoriza-
tion to remove "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office");Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897) (fixing of federal district
attorney's term of office by Congress does not affect president's power to
remove such attorney before experation of the term); Morgan v. T. V. A.,
115 F. 2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940) cert. denied 312 U. S. 701 (1941) (sus-
tained president's remov al at pleasure of T. V. A. board chairman despite
fixing of term and provision of the appointment authorization act thatpresident might remove only for stated causes, since the T. V. A. "ispredominantly an administrative arm of the executive department .. .") ;
United States ex rel. Bigler v. Avery, 24 Fed. Cas. 902, No. 14,481 (C. C.
N. D. Cal. 1867) ("... the power of removal [in that case, removal of
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district internal revenue assessor] must be conceded to the executive by
the courts. Congress had practically so conceded it, for three-fourths of
a century . . ." 24 Fed. Cas. at 906). See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602, 626, 632 (1935) (admitting the president's power
to remove at will "purely executive officers" but disapproving dicta in the
Myers case supra which seemed to give the president's power even broader
scope).
(3) The president cannot remove a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
officer whose removal is limited by Congress to a stated cause or causes,
unless removal is made as required. In such a case the fixing of tenure
by Congress does not seem to be material except as a factor in determining
the legislative intent that the term is not to be curtailed in the absence
of a specified cause for removal. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935) (president could not remove at pleasure a commissioner
of the FTC who was removable for cause only by the terms of the act
authorizing his appointment, and who had been appointed thereunder for
a seven-year term); see Morgan v. T. V. A., supra.
Congress clearly thinks that it may assume the power to remove two
quasi-legislative officers, the comptroller general and assistant comptroller
general. Under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 20, 23-4,
1U. S. C. §41 (1940), these officers are removable only by joint resolu-
tion of Congress for specified causes or by impeachment. Notwithstanding
the necessity of presidential approval of a joint resolution, the effect of
this statute is to place initiation of the removal process entirely in the
hands of Congress and to proscribe removal by the president in any event.
The statute gives the president no more affirmative power to remove the
officers concerned than he would have been granted had Congress insisted
on removal solely by concurrent resolution. (The original bill authorized
removal by concurrent resolution, but this was vetoed by President Wilson
as an unconstitutional limitation on the president's power of removal. 59
CONG. REc. 8609 [1920].)
It would seem that the broad rationale of separation of powers an-
nounced in the Humphrey case supra would have permitted the Court in
United States v. Lovett to decide that Section 304 had infringed the
president's power to remove "purely executive" officers, without the neces-
sity of deciding whether Congress has the power summarily to remove
other kinds of officers. The basic departure of the Humphrey case from
the strong judicial deferences to the executive power in the Myers case
and earlier cases supra is implicit in the following language:
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed
and is hardly open to serious question . . . The sound application of a
principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from
imposing his control in the house of another who is master there . .
[Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States supra, 295 U. S. at 629-30]
This principle ought to operate against congressional infringements just
as effectively as against those of the president, while at the same time
lending support to the proposition that the president's power to remove
"purely executive" officers is not only unrestricted, but also exclusive.
The Court in the Lovett case, in order to resolve the removal power
issue, would probably have found it necessary to determine whether re-
spondents Watson and Dodd were "purely executive" officers or quasi-legis-
lative agents of Congress. Although they were employees of the FCC,
the United States argued forcefully in its brief that Watson and Dodd
were really executive officers because they worked for the Foreign Broad-
cast Intelligence Service in "exclusively executive matters" and without
performing any regulatory function. Brief for Petitioner, p. 31-2. There
was no such difficulty, of course, as to respondent Lovett, who, as Execu-
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in tackling that problem had already been exposed by the Court's
previous dealings with it.73 But enlarging the area of legislative
attaint to the extent accomplished by the Lovett decision could
also prove troublesome.
For example, no one suggests that Congress does not have the
power to prescribe the qualification of loyalty or other qualifica-
tions reasonably related to security and efficiency for holding
federal office. Congress did so in Sections 9 and 9A of the Hatch
Act, of which Section 9A in particular appears close to the
Lovett concept of attainder:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any
capacity by any agency of the Federal Government, whose
compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds au-
thorized or appropriated by any Act of Congress, to have
membership in any political party or organization which
advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of gov-
ernment in the United States.(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section
shall be immediately removed from the position or office
held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropri-
ated by any Act of Congress for such position or office shall
be used to pay the compensation of such person.74
The class at which this statute is aimed is, of course, readily
ascertainable, no trial is required for removal,741 and the only
tive Assistant to the Governor of the Virgin Islands, was a virginally
executive officer.
73. Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out in concurring with the Lovett
result that "So far as the issues [in the Myers case, note 72 supra] could
be foreseen they were elaborately dealt with in opinions aggregating nearly
two hundred pages. Within less than a decade an opinion of fifteen pages
[in the Humphrey case, note 72 supra] largely qualified what the Myers
case had apparently so voluminously settled.. ." 328 U. S. at 328.
74. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5 U. S. C. A. § 118j (Supp. 1948). See Note,
45 MicH. L. REv. 98, 101 (1946). In 1941 Congress began to include similar
qualifications in all its appropriations for salaries and wages of federal
employees. See e. g., 55 STAT. 92, 123 (1941), 55 STAT. 446, 465 (1941),
61 STAT. 361, 377 (1947).
74a. Perhaps Section 9A contemplates implementation by the removing
agencies so as to guarantee some sort of administrative hearing for em-
ployees under loyalty investigations. At any rate, there are indications
that that has been the practice. For example, in United Publio Workers
v. Mitchell, text at note 78 infra, one of the appellant-employees had
been charged by the Civil Service Commission with ordinary political
activity prohibited by Section 9 of the Hatch Act, and a removal order
had been proposed by the Commission subject to the employee's right under
Commission procedure to reply to the charge and to present evidence In
refutation. One of the Commission's rules requires "due notice and oppor-
tunity for explanation." 4 CODE FED. REns. § 15.1 (Cum. Supp. 1943),
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. at 81, 92. As to the per-
missible scope of a fitness investigation by the Civil Service Commission
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apparent obstacles to calling the act a bill of attainder are (1)
that it operates prospectively, i. e. applies from the date of
enactment to future activity by federal employees, and (2) that,
although it proscribes a named type of subversive activity, it
does not exact punishment therefor, but merely protects the
inner organs of the government from such activity.
Yet several of the old English bills of attainder, and there is
no mistaking their identities as such, operated prospectively;
and there is no reason to suppose that they contemplated any-
thing more than arrest on information and belief, if that much,
as a preliminary to the attaint and punishment."5 Hence it would
appear that bills of attainder are not necessarily ex post fact&,'7
even though in the usual nature of things they have been. A
legislative act which, without a trial, inflicts punishment for
specified conduct, past or future, should be a bill of attainder
within the meaning of the Constitution.
under Section 9A, see United States v. Marzani, 71 F. Supp. 615 (D. C.
1947), aff'd 168 F. 2d 133 (D. C. Cir. 1948), aff'd per curiam 335 U. S.
805 (1948). Removals under Section 9A would now seem clearly to be
subject to the procedure and standards of "loyalty" prescribed by the
President's Loyalty Order of March 21, 1947. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12
FW. REG. 1935 (1947).
Although "due process" is not always synonymous with judicial process
to the extent that an administrative hearing will satisfy the basic require-
ments of due process in many situations, there is little doubt that ajudicial trial is a necessary prerequisite to punishment. Both Justices
Field and Black in the Cummings, Garland, and Lovett cases emphasize
that a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a "judicial trial"
or "trial in court" is a bill of attainder. It follows that if Section 9A of
the Hatch Act inflicts punishment by removal from office, a "fair hear-
ing" would not keep it from being a bill of attainder. Nor would the
rationale of the Lovett decision have permitted a different result in that
case even if respondents had been given a fair hearing by the congres-
sional subcommittee recommending their removals.
75. See the act quoted in the text at note 9 supra. It is difficult to
explain the language "and are hereby attainted" as constituting anything
less than legislative attaint, notwithstanding the attainder was imposed
for acts done "from and after the First day of February next ensuing."
76. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Lovett case
apparently concedes that not all bills of attainder have been ex post facto,
but makes the following argument as to Section 304: (1) "If Section
304 is a bill of attainder, it is also an ex post facto law," because the
basis for calling it a bill of attainder is that it punishes for past "sub-
versive" acts for which no punishment had previously been provided.(2) But "No one claims that Section 304 is an ex post facto law." (3)
Therefore, "if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish
that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 328
U. S. 303, 318, 322-3 (1946). The fallacy in this argument lies in the
fact that no one had to claim that Section 304 was an ex post facto law
in order to call it a bill of attainder.
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It is true that Section 9A of the Hatch Act, placed alongside
any typical criminal statute, would not appear to reflect at re-
tributive purpose, but neither did Section 304 in the Lovett case.
That the latter was directed toward named individuals might
help to indicate punishment, but calling names is not a requisite
of attainder. On the other hand, Section 9A looks much more
like a bill of attainder than does Section 304 in that the former
cites the particular conduct for which a deprivation will be im-
posed-the deprivation itself being almost the same as in Sec-
tion 304.7
Despite the Lovett case, however, the Supreme Court has since
furnished reason to believe that Section 9A is safe from the fate
of Section 304. In United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell78 the Court upheld Section 979 of the Hatch Act as it
was applied to effect removals of certain federal employees for
ordinary political activity. The attainder issue was neither
raised by the parties nor mentioned by the Court, the principal
challenge being based on Amendment I. But the Court's holding
that Section 9 violated neither that Amendment nor the due
process clause of Amendment V precludes conjecture that Sec-
tion 9 is a bill of attainder. For a single statute to meet the
requirements of due process and yet to be a bill of attainder
would seem constitutionally improbable, if not impossible. And
if the necessary effect of the Mitchell case is that Section 9 is
not a bill of attainder, Section 9A should be similarly immune.
It would ge possible to distinguish Section 9A and to charac-
terize its sanction as punishment, on the ground that the kind of
activity it prohibits, though non-criminal absent a conspiracy to
overthrow the government, is more reprehensible and closer to
crime than ordinary political activity; and the worse the conduct,
the more reasonable a suspicion of punitive reaction. But con-
trariwise, the worse the conduct, the more likely to be reasonable
is the connection between reaction and the legitimate object of
security.
77. The only substantial difference between the deprivation of Section
9A and that of Section 304 is that the former reaches appropriations
only for the particular office from which an employee might be removed,
whereas Section 304 cut off salaries for any government jobs the re-
spondents might hold in the future as well as at the time of enactment,
except for jury or military service.
78. 330 U. S. 75 (1947), affirming United Federal Workers of America
v. Mitchell, 56 F. Supp. 621 (D. C. 1944).
79. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U. S. C. A. § 118i (Supp. 1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/7
THE ATTAINDER BOGY IN MODERN LEGISLATION
In the cases since United States v. Lovett which have forced
the attainder issue, the courts, including the Supreme Court,
have shown no inclination to utilize the expanded but vague
contours of legislative punishment drawn by the Lovett case.
Rather they have uniformly relied on the older precedents and
the older limits of punishment. Thus Section 9 (h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act,', in requiring non-Communist affidavits of union
officers as a prerequisite to certification of the union as exclusive
bargaining agent, or to union initiation of an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint, has been held not to be a bill of attainder in
National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog.8  The District
Court for the District of Columbia held in that case that the
affidavit was a valid condition of granting the privileges author-
ized by the act, and that denying a privilege to one who will not
meet such a condition is not punishment. The Court did not
make clear just why this is not punishment, when revoking the
privilege of federal employment for non-compliance with the
valid condition of unquestioned loyalty may be punishment under
the Lovett case. The Court merely said, "Cf. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in United States v. Lovett."82 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a memorandum opinion 83
without finding it necessary to consider the validity of Section
9(h).
The same section was again sustained by another federal court
in Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 where the Court thought that
Section 9 (h) "operates not to impose punishment but to safe-
guard important public interests against potential evil. .... 8
The Court, rather pointedly it seems, did not cite the Lovett
case, but instead relied on the ancient language of Cummings v.
Missouri. Similarly, the respondent in N. L. R. B. v. Edw. G.
Budd Mfg. Co.56 urged to no avail that the Lovett case required
invalidating the Taft-Hartley Act as a bill of attainder insofar
as it removed supervisory employees from the protection of the
80. 61 STAT. 136, 143 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159(h) (Supp. 1948).
81. 78 F. Supp. 146 (D. C. 1938).
82. Id. at 164.
83. 334 U. S. 854 (1948).
84. 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. granted 69 Sup. Ct. 480 (1949).
85. 170 F. 2d at 267.
86. 169 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub nom. Foreman's
Ass'n of America v. Edw. G. Budd Mfg. Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 411 (1949).
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Wagner Act.17 And the Supreme Court of Tennessee, without
mentioning the Lovett case, has held that a statute repealing a
prior statute, which had authorized licensing of naturopaths,
and prohibitifig the practice of naturopathy in the state, was not
a bill of attainder.88 Before 1946 this would have been a routine
decision, and probably it still is so far as Tennessee is concerned.
VII. CONCLUSION
At a round table meeting of law teachers in December, 1948,80
Mr. Charles P. Curtis0 developed the thesis that protection of
our civil liberties has too often been thrust upon the Supreme
Court. Mr. Curtis contended that in "living up to our expecta-
tions" the Court has repeatedly "taken a big lead off first base,"
and commented on the Lovett case as a prime example of that
lead.9
Even if the Court really went further and stole second base,
the result was and is widely approved. But there is little reason
to suppose that the Lovett method of reaching that result was
a pioneering move into an unexplored territory of constitutional
protection. Subsequent decisions to date do not bear it out. It
is entirely possible that the attainder theory was the best avail-
able expedient in view of a combination of partly hidden but
weighty factors: (1) the severe difficulty, despite Justices
Frankfurter and Reed, of finding a tenable basis for avoiding
all the constitutional issues, the difficulty perhaps being aggra-
vated by the Court's obvious disapproval of Congress' witch-
hunt attitude in the matter; (2) the Court's much greater and
understandable reluctance either to resolve the removal power
issue or to question on a due process basis the investigation
methods of Congress; and (3) the logical impasse to deciding
87. 61 STAT. 136, 137, 151 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152(3), 152(11),
164(a) (Supp. 1948).
88. Davis v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S. W. 2d 343 (1947). See also
Perez v. Board of Police Com'rs of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178
P. 2d 537 (1947) (resolution by police conissioners barring police officers
from joining any union not exclusively made up of city employees held
not a bill of attainder).
89. Round Table. "Security, Loyalty, and Civil Rights," December 29,
1948, at the annual convention of the Association of American Law Schools,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
90. Prominent Boston attorney and student of the United States Su-
preme Court; author, LIONs UNDER THE THRONE (1947).
91. Ar. Curtis' prescription for this condition was to accelerate popular
self-help, with lawyers and teachers carrying the major load.
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that Section 304 violated substantive due process without neces-
sarily deciding either the removal power or the attainder ques-
tion2
Quite probably the Lovett case will prove to have been more
of a toeur de force than a potent threat to deprivative, or even
discriminatory, legislation.
92. It would seem that removal of respondents could not have infringed
their substantive rights under the due process clause of Amendment V
if, as to them, Congress had the constitutional power of summary re-
moval. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, 328 U. S. at
328. On the other hand, if Congress had such a removal power but abused
it by a punitive exercise, the resulting due process violation merged with
a bill of attainder. That leaves open the question whether a congressional
removal power might be abused so as to violate due process and yet fall
short of punishment. The answer is "no" if the scope and reach of that
power over the officers concerned is the same as the president's power to
remove "purely executive" officers.
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